Faced with mounting government debt and the high cost of paying for government programs, the Biden administration has launched a worldwide initiative for countries to commit to a fifteen percent minimum corporate tax. From early roots in Swiss banks over a century ago, various forms of offshore finance and tax mitigation have flourished as finance globalized throughout the 20th and early 21st century. Dubbed “offshore” finance because of the many small island nations and dependencies involved in this type of financial structuring, offshore financial centers commonly provide favorable tax laws, higher rates of return, reduced regulation, and above all confidentiality.[1]
Responding to America’s financial crisis in 2009, the U.S. implemented increasingly aggressive tax enforcement. Congress passed the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), launched international prosecutions, and coerced foreign banks to disclose the information of U.S. taxpayers.
This paper will explore what comes next for the world of offshore finance, tax mitigation, and overseas tax enforcement, with a particular focus on Ireland and the U.S. Part I will review the nature of offshore finance and tax mitigation, and U.S. enforcement efforts to-date, as well as the proposed fifteen percent minimum tax rate. Part II, in turn will analyze potential responses by the Irish tax authorities. Part III will examine the ways the U.S. can modify its own tax policies—and enforcement strategies—to counter potential changes in the coming years whether a fifteen percent minimum rate is implemented, or flaunted. This paper contends that from the standpoint of Irish policymakers, there remains a bright future for tax mitigation and it further argues that Congress and the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) can do more to foster federal revenue streams through a different approach to policy and enforcement.
I. BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHARING, TAX MITIGATION, AND OFFSHORING STRATEGIES
A. Tax Policy and Enforcement
In the years after World War II, the small cadre of advanced, industrialized countries in North America, Europe, and East Asia diverged considerably in their approaches to taxation.[2] Germany and Japan modified their tax policies to promote export led growth; Germany for instance emphasized rapid administrative changes to its tax policy. In Northern European countries like Sweden, governments adopted aggressive VAT tax regimes, whereas the U.S. leaned heavily on more progressive personal income tax and corporate income tax. [3] Japan, meanwhile, opted for individual income tax cuts, a high savings rate, and significant spending on public works, coupled with social spending—paid for with taxation of export-oriented companies and progressive taxation.[4]
In the 1960s, Peggy (Richman) Musgrave popularized the debate about whether U.S. international tax policy should favor capital export neutrality or capital import neutrality.[5] In the capital export neutrality model, multinationals are subject to worldwide taxation with an unlimited credit for foreign income taxes paid, whereas capital import neutrality would exempt U.S. corporations from paying taxes on revenue in a foreign country to avoid economic disadvantages.[6] This debate has morphed into a new realm, led by professors Mihir Desai and Jim Hines, who have written of capital ownership neutrality.[7] To allow U.S.-based companies greatest flexibility in foreign acquisitions, a capital ownership model (like capital import) would involve a switch to territorial taxation, unless other major economies were to shift to a worldwide taxation system.[8]
The U.S. emphasized worldwide taxation beginning with the Revenue Act of 1918 and the subsequent Revenue Act of 1918, a state of affairs that existed until the shift toward a hybrid model with the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.[9] Under the current hybrid system, certain thresholds kick-in for foreign revenue. Foreign income representing a normal, ten percent return on tangible asset depreciation used to produce foreign income is exempt from U.S. taxation.[10] However, income above the ten percent threshold is subject to U.S. taxation with a fifty percent deduction—only eighty percent of foreign taxes may be credited against U.S. taxes.[11] Tax theorists caution that a territorial tax system can encourage increased offshoring of funds without adequate measures to prevent base erosion.[12]
An alternative tax policy model is worldwide taxation without deferral. Among major economies, only Brazil currently employs this model.[13] From the standpoint of capital ownership neutrality, the non-deferral model has drawbacks, potentially penalizing a country’s own companies in foreign markets.[14] However, such downsides would be negligible at best so long as the U.S. corporate tax rate stays relatively low, as with the twenty-one percent rate adopted in 2017.[15] Under the current IRS determination in IRC section 7701(a)(4) and (5), a corporation is considered foreign or domestic based on its incorporation, although this can be altered with a management and control test.[16]
Tax enforcement is a critical facet of sovereignty in every country. Viewed through an economic lens, from the standpoint of revenue-gathering effectiveness, governments may benefit from somewhat random tax enforcement that can create a climate of moderate uncertainty encouraging more substantial payment and reporting.[17]
Research in the 1980s suggests that higher marginal tax rates increase the incentive to evade taxes.[18] Indeed, reduced taxes lead to greater revenue received from taxes in some cases.[19]
While the magnitude of potential evasion with base erosion is very significant, analysis of Greek tax data, as well as IRS data suggests that medium-sized domestic companies are among the most significant evaders, where simpler accounting standards and closely held status allows companies to employ workers “under the table,” or issue false invoices.[20] Data from the Greek case study may not be immediately applicable to other countries, but aspects of it are born out elsewhere in the academic literature. Income source is often determinative, with greater evasion among businesses that primarily receive cash.[21]
In 1956, Solow articulated a widely cited theory of economic growth based on capital stock and labor, emphasizing that taxes may have little impact on long-term economic growth.[22] Research in the 1990s and early 2000s based off of Solow’s interpretation suggests that to optimize economic growth, a dollar of public spending should have five times the return of private investment to justify the rate of taxation needed to get that revenue.[23]
The best tax systems have low enforcement costs, but compliance costs rise steeply when complexity increases. In the U.S. the complexity of the tax code, taken in combination with state and local taxations prompts nearly half of low-income individual filers to hire tax professionals, and even more higher income individual filers.[24] All of this generates the type of meaningless job creation that will later become a footnote in a Bureau of Labor Statistics report, but results in compliance costs of up to seven percent of revenue raised by federal and state taxes.[25] Corporations endure even greater complexity due to the multifaceted ways in which they conduct business—and that burden falls most on small and medium firms that have limited personnel to dedicate to compliance.[26]
B. Offshore Finance, Tax Mitigation, and Tax Avoidance
Many small island countries, and some small mainland countries in Europe, Asia, and Central America function as offshore financial centers and tax havens.[27] These small states compete with one another offering low or no taxes and traditionally refusing to exchange information with larger countries, both in the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) and outside of it.[28]
Many tax havens are self-governing British overseas territories, with common law familiar to U.S. and U.K. large corporations, such as the British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, or Gibraltar, while others such as Switzerland and Liechtenstein offer other types of law familiar in mainland Europe.[29] Offshore financial centers are essentially jurisdictions that offer financial services to non-residents.[30] But above all, these jurisdictions offer legal advantages like favorable tax rates or banking secrecy, for both legitimate and potentially illegitimate business activity.[31] Apart from the possibility of hiding money from taxation, some have dubbed offshore financial centers the “spiritual home of laundered drugs money.”[32] Traditionally, banking secrecy is the central element of offshore financial centers.[33]
In addition to confidentiality, offshore financial centers commonly support other forms of financial activity, including carry trade and money market activities, or hedge funds.[34] U.S. banks are limited in how they can invest after the passage of Dodd-Frank, creating opportunities for banks in Singapore or Cyprus to invest more widely and offer higher returns. For instance, the Cayman Islands are famed for hedge funds. In fact, more than fifty percent of hedge funds worldwide were domiciled in the Cayman Islands in 2016 and the small island chain amounted to the world’s fifth largest financial center in terms of portfolio investments. Apart from U.S. sovereign debt held by the Chinese and Japanese central banks, funds in the Cayman Islands are the largest holders of U.S. securities and serve as a vital conduit to U.S. markets for Chinese and Japanese investors.[35]
While it may be comparatively easy to drum up public opprobrium against offshore financial centers, the reality is that intermediate levels of tax offshoring and mitigation exist even in more mainstream national economies and legal systems. Base erosion and profit sharing is the primary means by which this quasi-legal international tax arbitrage takes place.[36]
In 2013, corporate income tax contributed around ten percent of total tax revenues on average across the OECD.[37] After lows in the 1970s, corporate income tax contributions to overall government revenue increased throughout the OECD until declines at the time of the 2009 financial crisis.[38] Beginning with statutory tax reforms and changes to depreciation schedules in the U.S. and U.K. in the 1980s, most OECD members apart from Chile and Hungary actually reduced corporate tax rates by the end of 2000s.[39] Nevertheless, BEPS drew increased attention from policymakers as multiple studies found increased segregation between the location of business activity and the reporting of profits for tax purposes.[40]
BEPS has come into being at a time of financial and economic globalization, throughout which global value chains have expanded along with the role of so-called “knowledge-based assets” like patents.[41] Even with somewhat reduced statutory rates, corporations have responded with varying forms of tax arbitration that often involve intellectual property.[42]
Fearing a “race to the bottom,” many larger OECD economies have responded with measures intended to curb BEPS.[43] This has taken the form of anti-avoidance rules, taxing to domestic shareholders whether or not foreign revenue is repatriated to them, disallowing deduction of some interest expenses, anti-hybrid rules, and anti-base erosion rules that impose higher withholding tax.[44]
C. Irish Taxation and the Rise and Fall of the “Double Irish”
Over the long-term, countries play a large role in setting tax expectations. For instance, Sweden’s centralized state and high tax rates stretch back to the 17th century.[45] Ireland today is known as a hub for transfer pricing and financial offshoring, but this reputation is recent compared with the deep roots of the aforementioned Swedish tax traditions.
At the time of the Irish Free State’s independence in 1922, the new government inherited a tax administration with staffing levels equivalent to those of the mid-18th century, and a population grudgingly accustomed to coercive, regressive taxes.[46] The government struggled to raise revenue throughout the early decades of independence. In the 1970s, this mission became even more important to keep up with rising government expenditures, and the government relied heavily on indirect taxes to avoid raising the ire of the island’s anti-tax population.[47]
Efforts to avoid a return to the coercive taxes of the British era in practice meant that the tax burden fell on only a plurality of the population. In the mid-1970s, slightly over 800,000 Pay As You Earn income taxpayers shouldered ninety percent of the country’s income tax burden.[48] In a bid to boost to boost revenues, the 1980s witnessed computerization of tax collection, and a three-fold increase in the number of cases handled by the Revenue Commissioners.[49] But administrative challenges and public opposition endured.[50]
Fianna Fáil, one of the country’s two largest political parties, attempted imposing a two-percent levy on farm produce in 1979, but was forced to back down after the Irish Farmers’ Associations led popular protests.[51] Perhaps revealing the weakness of the country’s Revenue Commissioners, after the failed implementation of a resource tax in 1980, the Irish government went so far as to reimburse taxpayers that had complied.[52] Faced with a government debt to GDP ratio double the European average, Fianna Fail led an initiative to create a voluntary tax amnesty.
The 1980s proved to be a difficult time for the Irish economy.[53] Inflation reached eleven percent by 1986, the debt-to-GDP ratio reached 120 percent, and the country once again witnessed outmigration of its citizens.[54] Mirroring public sector cuts common across the globe, after 1987, Fianna Fail implemented strict public sector cuts during a “retrenchment” period.[55] Although politically unpopular, the measures managed to right the sinking ship of the country’s economy and Ireland began to prosper in the early 1990s thanks to information technology investment in its English-speaking workforce.[56]
Ireland ultimately honed its foreign direct investment pitch—and its tax collection strategy--with the Taxes Consolidation Act of 1997, amended in 1999 to establish a 12.5 percent corporate tax rate.[57] As a result, for nearly twenty years, Ireland enjoyed a special status as a hub for American companies doing business in Europe.
Clever tax solicitors soon developed various iterations of the “double Irish” structure. A U.S. company licenses its IP to an Irish subsidiary, which then licenses this IP to a second Irish company.[58] Through “check the box” rules, the second Irish subsidiary chooses to be treated as a passthrough entity, rather than a corporation, thus concealing its finances from the IRS.[59] The incomes of the subsidiaries can then be combined to determine whether sales by either company become Subpart F income.[60] Tax planners sometimes also adopted additional steps, such as setting up a third Dutch subsidiary, exchanging stock for cash under Section 368(a)(2)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code, having a subsidiary buy a newly acquired company from the parent, or using a newly acquired company turned subsidiary to borrow cash from a preexisting foreign subsidiary using Section 368(a)(2)(F).[61]
In 2016, Ireland’s tax revenue as percentage of GDP was twenty-three percent below the OECD average.[62] On August 30, 2016, the European Commission ordered Ireland to pay $14.5 billion, as well as interest, in unpaid taxes from Apple Inc. for the tax period 2003 to 2014.[63] In 1991, with a renewal in 2007, Apple made an arrangement with the Irish Revenue Commissioners such that only €50 million of its €16 billion pretax profits in 2011 was taxable income in Ireland.[64] The EU considered this to be an illegal tax benefit, amounting to an effective tax rate of 0.05 percent—far below Ireland’s formal tax rate of 12.5 percent.[65]
The 12.5 percent corporate tax rate proved highly attractive for large American multinational companies. Eight hundred American companies located operations in Ireland, including Microsoft, Apple, and Pfizer, the three of which collectively for somewhere between thirty and forty percent of all corporate taxes received, with ten companies comprising fifty-six percent of all corporate tax receipts.[66]
Large players like Microsoft and Apple managed to achieve effective tax rates as low as 2.4 percent using the elaborate “Double Irish, Dutch sandwich” method, which the Irish government eventually scrapped in 2015 giving companies five years to comply.[67] To achieve ultra-low rates, American companies would incorporate a subsidiary in Ireland with a tax residence in Bermuda.[68] In an arm’s length transaction, the American company would transfer intellectual property rights to the subsidiary.[69] As a result, the subsidiary would be subject to Bermuda’s zero percent income tax, Ireland’s policy of non-taxation for an Irish corporation with foreign residence, and U.S. policy of not taxing foreign income.[70]
The next step in the “Double Irish Walkthrough” involved the creation of a second Irish subsidiary and the licensing of intellectual property to that subsidiary from Bermuda to take advantages of Irish tax deductions for royalty income.[71] Some companies went a step further with the “Dutch Sandwich,” in which a Bermuda-based Irish subsidiary licensed intellectual property to a third subsidiary in the Netherlands.[72] Because of tax treaties between the Netherlands and Bermuda, this reduced the tax payments on royalties to almost nothing and allowed the second Irish subsidiary to take advantage of the 12.5 percent corporate tax rate.[73] Apple took its own approach, with the Virgin Islands substituted for Bermuda in the tax mitigation process.[74]
By the mid-2010s, the E.U. grew increasingly frustrated with low effective rates in Ireland. The Irish government came under intense pressure from the E.U. to modify its tax rate and ultimately announced that it would do so by 2015.[75] However, in reality, Ireland retained its 12.5 percent rate until an announcement in October, 2021 that it would increase the rate to fifteen percent as part of the OECD fifteen percent minimum.[76]
D. U.S. Taxation and the Rise of Overseas Enforcement
The US famously taxes its citizens on worldwide income.[77] US citizens must file tax returns with the IRS for all income from both foreign and domestic sources, although individuals may be eligible for a foreign tax credit in some cases.[78] To handle double taxation issues with the nearly nine million Americans living abroad, the U.S. has brokered tax treaties with many other countries, agreeing to share information about taxpayers—but only upon request.[79] Similarly, the U.S. is a party to Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) with other countries, typically those with whom it lacks a double taxation treaty.[80] Prior to 2008, TIEAs were primarily with offshore finance hubs like Guernsey, Antigua, the Netherlands, or Aruba.[81]
Traditionally, most OECD member countries have engaged in territorial taxation, including France, Canada, Germany, and the Netherlands.[82] When the U.K. and Japan abandoned worldwide taxation in-favor of territorial taxation in 2009, the U.S. became among the minority in the OECD with its worldwide reach.[83]
The U.S. is somewhat unusual because it offers a foreign tax credit, even if a foreign state does not reciprocate.[84] Bilateral tax treaties, in turn, have built on this system. If benefits offered through many tax treaties were implemented by statute, they would likely be itemized as part of tax expenditure budgets.[85]
The rapid globalization of the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s led to a rise in tax offshoring. However, laissez faire attitudes to tax enforcement came to an end in 2010 with the passage of the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA).[86] The IRS and Department of Justice launched a major crackdown on offshoring following the 2008 UBS whistleblower leaks.[87]
In the immediate aftermath of the 2008-2009 financial crisis, the US and other countries began cracking down on their taxpayers, often extraterritorially. FATCA is not the only example of extraterritorial tax enforcement. In December, 2009, China issued Circular 698, extending tax authority over transactions between foreign entities outside of China that transfer interest into a domestic enterprise.[88]
In some cases, measures designed to prevent offshoring can trigger free trade concerns. For instance, in 2012, Panama sought consultation with Argentina before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), contending that Argentina’s defensive tax on low tax jurisdictions violated GATS non-discrimination principles.[89] In 2013, Argentina in Decree 589/2013 swapped from references to “jurisdictions with low or no taxes” to “jurisdictions not considered ‘cooperative for tax transparency purposes.”’[90] The Argentine Tax Authority would publish a list annually of countries it considered uncooperative for tax purposes, subjecting cross-border transactions to defense taxes.[91]
Argentina adopted four defense measures, including withholding tax on payments of interest and remuneration, a presumption of unjustified increase in wealth, transaction valuations based on transfer prices, and a payment received rule for allocation of expenditures.[92]
For its part, beginning in 2009, IRS implemented Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Programs. Citizens with offshore accounts reveal those accounts to avoid criminal prosecution.[93] In 2012, the US prosecuted three Wegelin Bank employees and the bank itself, forcing it to shut down business, signaling a willingness to crackdown on Swiss banks.[94] Swiss legislators ultimately adopted the details of the Swiss Bank Program into law by the end of August, 2013.[95] The program defined four categories of banks, with Category 2 including those not yet under prosecution but suspected of facilitating U.S. tax offenses.[96] In exchange for fines and non-prosecution, Category 2 banks handed over details on 35,000 U.S. accounts.[97] In response to FATCA, other countries turned to Intergovernmental Agreements and leaned more heavily on the OECD Common Reporting Standard.[98]
There is a certain irony to the recent vigor of U.S. extraterritorial tax enforcement given the vibrant tax competition among the U.S. states, as sovereigns. For instance, in 1984, anticipating the growing significance of patents, copyrights, and trademarks, Delaware allowed income derived from intellectual property assets to avoid state corporate taxation.[99] Major corporations rushed to form wholly owned subsidiaries, dubbed Delaware Intellectual Property Holding Companies (DIPHC), which licenses that IP to parent or sibling companies in the other forty-nine states.[100]
Delaware’s status as an onshore tax haven is rivaled in different ways by perpetual trusts, particularly South Dakota.[101] The South Dakota Legislature abolished the rule against perpetuities in 1983, three years before the 1986 GST tax.[102] Delaware followed suit in 1995, kicking off a race among states to allow for perpetual trusts.[103] Statutory choice of law provisions, and even the Uniform Trust Code itself, allowed the law of that particular state to govern trust administration.[104]
II. IRISH RESPONSES
The present efforts to standardize international tax rates are within the wheelhouse of sovereign states to undertake, but stem from a misplaced belief in the effectiveness of tax enforcement. The prominence of digital funds transfers, taken together with tax treaties and TIEAs would seem to make it much difficult for corporations to achieve tax arbitrage in their international operations. But as the old adage goes, when one door closes, another one opens.
The fact that a large number of countries with many divergent policy interests have signed on to the OECD’s proposed tax rate suggests that the agreement may be viewed as largely symbolic, and thus could prove difficult to enforce. International agreements are famously difficult to enforce. That has long been true of environmental agreements that lack binding arbitration. Agreements around trade and foreign investment tend to be more readily enforceable because of the element of reciprocity, and in a sense tax policy is somewhat similar. OECD policymakers may choose to assent to the fifteen percent minimum rate because they fear the possibility of stark U.S. enforcement, desire ready access to U.S. markets and capital, or because they believe their own countries will need as much access to tax revenue as possible due to the debts incurred during the Covid-19 pandemic.
There is little to stop countries that have joined the agreement from striking individual tax deals, or coming up with clever write-offs for research and development or cost of business activities. The risk with such a far-reaching global system, to the extent that it has any force is that it will force capital “underground,” to more far-flung tax havens on remote Pacific islands—or the metropolises of Nigeria and Pakistan—where opportunities for meaningful tax enforcement will be even fewer. It encourages nation-states to engage in more potentially corrupt tax deals with individual corporations, with potential anti-competitive effects globally and in home markets. Even if it did prove effective at garnering enhanced tax revenues, the inclination to shield capital from taxation never goes away. Corporations and wealthy individuals could rehouse capital into perpetual trusts, like those in South Dakota, or sink capital into different investments like cryptocurrencies or real estate. Particularly in the aftermath of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine and the implementation of hard hitting sanctions against the Russian Federation, there is little reason for Russia to cooperate—although its strategic circumstances likely mean that much higher taxes may be in the offing for its citizens in the short-run.
Irish policymakers are at the helm of a sovereign state, and could easily pull out of a tax agreement in the same way that Canada withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol, or many countries have withdrawn from the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction. This might expose Ireland to heightened scrutiny and crackdowns by both the U.S. and the E.U., but careful accounting might suggest that these risks are merited with the economic impacts of tax changes.
Proponents of the fifteen percent rate have argued that the increase is negligible, but would result in considerable tax gains for Ireland from corporate income, with little impact on Irish taxpayers. Projections for 2011 suggest that if a fifteen percent rate were in place at the time, Ireland would have realized an additional €700 million in revenue.[105] Now that Ireland has formally amended its corporate tax rate, the experiment will play out in the real world.
If the fifteen percent rate proves viable, Ireland also has other options at its disposal. It could create specialized tax carveouts for patents and intellectual property, formally adhering to the fifteen percent rate while offering something much different. Similarly, it could offer generous depreciation schedules around technology and intellectual property that spur economic development in the country.
Ireland could also amend its transfer pricing policies by revisiting tax treaties with the U.S. and U.K. Updates to both treaties could add more specific provisions for transfer pricing, and define a process for advance pricing agreements. In the event that a fifteen percent effective rate takes effect, Ireland could develop new aggressive depreciation schemes and enhance its research and development allowances to encourage foreign direct investment within Irish borders.
A unique approach might allow enhanced data privacy and guarantees against government scrutiny to allow Irish banks and law firms to coordinate with remaining offshore finance hubs. This could be likened to the ways in which UBS has reshored many of its operations to Panama.
If Irish policymakers choose to assiduously follow the fifteen percent corporate tax rate, the country could explore other means of supporting its tax base. One unusual option is already in effect in Portugal: onshoring foreign private capital through residency sales. Political instability in Russia, Turkey, Iran, and China is significant, and many well-off citizens fear expropriation of assets by corrupt government officials. Ireland could sell permanent resident status, with a buy in of a certain threshold of income taxes that must be paid each year.
Ireland’s existing fame as an offshore financial hub, as well as its English speaking populace, and transparent common law legal system leave it well positioned to modify its tax policies and attract foreign investment, whether or not it adheres to a fifteen percent corporate tax rate.
III. U.S. ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES: TOWARD A GLOBAL FIFTEEN PERCENT MINIMUM?
For now, the U.S. continues to charge ahead with the fifteen percent plan under President Biden’s leadership. But policy priorities can change quickly, even within one administration. Should the U.S. continue with this course of action, or adopt a different one?
In American popular and academic media, there is a widespread conception that high net worth dodge taxes through aggressive plays, flaunting tax enforcement and that corporations do the same by even more sophisticated means. There may be truth to both suppositions, but tax evasion as Hollywood imagines it—with bags of cash on a private jet to the Cayman Islands—is likely much less common than careful planning of realized gains, depreciation, and transfer pricing. Indeed, the revelations of the Panama Papers and the Paradise Papers suggest it is high net worth individuals from Europe that take the greatest advantage of offshore finance because of the ability to “game” territorial tax systems.
Speaking at a Senate hearing in 2011, Steptoe & Johnston partner, Philip West, urged policymakers to adopt a territorial system of taxation, contending that it would enhance American economic competitiveness.[106] Formally, the U.S. now has a partial territorial system since the 2017 Tax Cut & Jobs Act.[107] The big risk with the current U.S. worldwide system is that U.S. companies with foreign rivals that might be forced to undergo a foreign acquisition for tax reasons. For the foreseeable future, large American technology companies like Google, Apple, and Microsoft may be “sticky” enough to remain in the U.S. But other firms are harder to police, particularly large pharmaceutical companies partially based in France, Switzerland, or Ireland. The Mexican corporate giant Grupo Bimbo owns Sarah Lee and other famed U.S. brands, and seems to be able to succeed in its operations in-part because of Mexico’s territorial tax system. Whether in the example of pharmaceuticals or baked goods, aspects of transfer pricing apply, but an inversion does not necessarily take place.
FATCA and the worldwide tax system raise enforcement costs for the federal government, making the IRS more like an intelligence agency than is its traditional purview. As a country that often promotes the values of sovereignty, FATCA is a glaring red flag that erodes territorial sovereignty. In a world where other large economies wield comparable power to the U.S., the precedent set by FATCA is an invitation for coercive extraterritorial enforcement by China that could easily produce harmful results both for American companies, and their European counterparts.
The U.S. is likely ill prepared to grapple with meaningful foreign tax enforcement, leading to the possibility of uneven enforcement and uncertainty for multinational corporations—and most of all for individuals and small and medium businesses with overseas earnings. Therefore, even if Congress chooses to retain FATCA, it should carefully analyze tax policy more broadly and refine objectives for the IRS.[108]
Even as the U.S. attempts to set corporate tax standards for the rest of the OECD, and many other large economies, it should borrow a page from other OECD members and adopt a territorial tax system, abandoning the cumbersome worldwide system once and for all. Dubbed by some the “participation exemption system,” a territorial system would return the focus to the limits of U.S. territory.[109] By 2016, ninety-one percent of non-U.S. OECD companies do business in territorial tax systems.[110] Therefore, the continued U.S. adherence to worldwide taxation places U.S. corporations at a disadvantage from the standpoint of compliance, compared to their peers throughout the rest of the OECD.
To-date, U.S. tax authorities have taken “carrot and stick” approaches, both leaning into enforcement under FATCA after 2010, and offering multinational corporations “repatriation holidays,” to repatriate funds to the U.S. from overseas without penalties.[111] However, the repatriation process, when it has occurred, acts as little more than a temporary tax break, that has done little to dissuade American companies from clever foreign tax arbitrage.[112]
A fifteen percent minimum rate in and of itself is still not enough to prevent foreign “tax plays,” because this threshold falls below the U.S. marginal effective corporate tax rate, particularly when state and local taxes are taken into account.[113]
Rep. Dave Camp, a Congressman from Michigan, issued the “Camp Proposal” in 2014. In his variation of territorial taxation, the U.S. would exempt ninety-five percent of eligible foreign subsidiary dividends, keeping aspects of foreign tax credits for the five percent of foreign subsidiary dividends still subject to U.S. taxation.[114] Territorial taxation proponents argue that although some labor and manufacturing jobs could be offshored, this would be outweighed by gains in administration, finance, and legal activities in the U.S. overseeing that overseas activity.[115]
In U.S. domestic taxation, accountants and tax advisors are accustomed to formulary apportionment in the context of state and local taxes.[116] Although no country has adopted this model for international taxation, some proponents have floated it in both the U.S. and E.U.[117] Critics argue that this particular model poses potential of abuse by clever tax planners allocating funds between different jurisdictions, and further add that the system might have high compliance costs.[118]
A further option considered by tax policy thinkers is elimination of the deferral privilege.[119] The goal of this approach would be to limit the relevance of foreign tax “plays.”[120] Abandoning the deferral privilege would result in the foreign income of American corporations immediately becoming taxable in the U.S.[121] Corporations would likely still be eligible for a tax credit on taxes paid on foreign income, but would lose much of their ability to engage in transfer pricing abuse.[122] That is because, the U.S. corporations would face the same (comparatively high) effective tax rate on their income regardless where in the world they do business.[123]
Because of the potential for high compliance costs with a formulary apportionment system, Congress should instead adopt territorial taxation modeled after the Camp Proposal, but incorporate careful economic analysis of the effects of foreign tax credits. Furthermore, Congress should repeal FATCA to limit extraterritorial overreach, but retain—and indeed expand—voluntary information sharing agreements with other countries. In a territorial taxation model, whether or not there is a fifteen percent minimum rate in-common across many peer economies, the U.S. will focus on where its tax enforcement can be most effective, and evenly applied. Furthermore, such a system will create an incentive for American corporations across industries to press for stable or reduced tax rates from Congress and the states.
IV. CONCLUSION
The U.S. should set aside its current effort to implement a fifteen percent minimum corporate tax rate. Because of the potential for high compliance costs with a formulary apportionment system, Congress should instead adopt territorial taxation modeled after the Camp Proposal, but incorporate careful economic analysis of the effects of foreign tax credits. Furthermore, Congress should repeal FATCA to limit extraterritorial overreach, but retain—and indeed expand—voluntary information sharing agreements with other countries.
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Taxation in Crisis: Tax Policy and the Quest for Economic Growth, 175-203 (2017). [27] Iris H-Y Chiu, From Multilateral to Unilateral Lines of Attack: The Sustainability of Offshore Tax Havens and Financial Centres in the International Legal Order, 31 Conn. J. Int'l L. 163, 165 (2016). [28] Iris H-Y Chiu, From Multilateral to Unilateral Lines of Attack: The Sustainability of Offshore Tax Havens and Financial Centres in the International Legal Order, 31 Conn. J. Int'l L. 163, 166 (2016). [29] Iris H-Y Chiu, From Multilateral to Unilateral Lines of Attack: The Sustainability of Offshore Tax Havens and Financial Centres in the International Legal Order, 31 Conn. J. Int'l L. 163, 166-67 (2016). [30] Mary Alice Young, Banking Secrecy and Offshore Financial Centers: Money Laundering and Offshore Banking, 35 (2012), see generally, Nigar Hashimzade & Yuliya Epifantseva, The Routledge Companion to Tax Avoidance Research, (2018). [31] Mary Alice Young, Banking Secrecy and Offshore Financial Centers: Money Laundering and Offshore Banking, 12 (2012). [32] Mary Alice Young, Banking Secrecy and Offshore Financial Centers: Money Laundering and Offshore Banking, 12 (2012). [33] Mary Alice Young, Banking Secrecy and Offshore Financial Centers: Money Laundering and Offshore Banking, 13 (2012). [34] See generally Tijn van Beurden & Joost Jonker, A perfect symbiosis: Curaçao, the Netherlands and financial offshore services, 1951–2013, 28 Financial History 67, 67-95 (2021). [35] Jan Fichtner, The Cayman conundrum: why is one tiny archipelago the largest financial centre in Latin America and the Caribbean?, London School of Economics, (Nov. 2, 2017), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/latamcaribbean/2017/11/02/the-cayman-conundrum-why-is-one-tiny-archipelago-the-largest-financial-centre-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean/. [36] Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Sharing, OECD, 15 (2013). [37] Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Sharing, OECD, 15 (2013). [38] Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Sharing, OECD, 15 (2013). [39] Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Sharing, OECD, 15 (2013). [40] Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Sharing, OECD, 20 (2013). [41] Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Sharing, OECD, 27 (2013). [42] Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Sharing, OECD, 74 (2013). [43] Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Sharing, OECD, 38 (2013). [44] Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Sharing, OECD, 38 (2013). [45] Douglas Kanter & Patrick Walsh, Taxation, Politics, and Protest in Ireland: 1662-2016, 331-355 (2019). [46] Douglas Kanter & Patrick Walsh, Taxation, Politics, and Protest in Ireland: 1662-2016, 331-355 (2019). [47] Douglas Kanter & Patrick Walsh, Taxation, Politics, and Protest in Ireland: 1662-2016, 331-355 (2019). [48] Douglas Kanter & Patrick Walsh, Taxation, Politics, and Protest in Ireland: 1662-2016, 331-355 (2019) (at the time of its accession to the European Economic Community, in 1973, the country also introduced a value-added tax (VAT) as a way to boot revenues). [49] Douglas Kanter & Patrick Walsh, Taxation, Politics, and Protest in Ireland: 1662-2016, 331-355 (2019). [50] Douglas Kanter & Patrick Walsh, Taxation, Politics, and Protest in Ireland: 1662-2016, 331-355 (2019). [51] Douglas Kanter & Patrick Walsh, Taxation, Politics, and Protest in Ireland: 1662-2016, 331-355 (2019). [52] Douglas Kanter & Patrick Walsh, Taxation, Politics, and Protest in Ireland: 1662-2016, 331-355 (2019). [53] Andrew P. Kummer, Pro-Business But Anti-Economy?: Why Ireland’s Staunch Protection of Its Corporate Tax Regime is Preventing a Celtic Phoenix from Rising from the Ashes of the Celtic Tiger, 9 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 284, 289 (2014). [54] Andrew P. Kummer, Pro-Business But Anti-Economy?: Why Ireland’s Staunch Protection of Its Corporate Tax Regime is Preventing a Celtic Phoenix from Rising from the Ashes of the Celtic Tiger, 9 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 284, 289 (2014). [55] Andrew P. Kummer, Pro-Business But Anti-Economy?: Why Ireland’s Staunch Protection of Its Corporate Tax Regime is Preventing a Celtic Phoenix from Rising from the Ashes of the Celtic Tiger, 9 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 284, 290 (2014). [56] Andrew P. Kummer, Pro-Business But Anti-Economy?: Why Ireland’s Staunch Protection of Its Corporate Tax Regime is Preventing a Celtic Phoenix from Rising from the Ashes of the Celtic Tiger, 9 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 284, 296-97 (2014). [57] Andrew P. Kummer, Pro-Business But Anti-Economy?: Why Ireland’s Staunch Protection of Its Corporate Tax Regime is Preventing a Celtic Phoenix from Rising from the Ashes of the Celtic Tiger, 9 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 284, 297 (2014) (citing Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 (Act No. 39/1997) (Ir.), available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1997/en/act/pub/0039/index.html and Finance Act 1999 (Act No. 2/1999) (Ir.), available at http:// www.irishstatutebook.ie/1999/en/act/pub/0002/sec007l.html#sec71. Kummer notes that Ireland previously had a ten percent tax rate for manufacturing activities); see also Lisa O’Carroll, Will Ireland’s corporation tax rise see tech companies leave Dublin?, The Guardian, (Oct. 23, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/23/will-irelands-corporation-tax-rise-see-tech-companies-leave-dublin#:~:text=Earlier%20this%20month%20Ireland%20signed%20up%20to%20landmark%20reforms%20for,system%20in%20almost%2020%20years (explaining that the ten percent rate dates to the 1960s and initially lured companies like Pfizer to Ireland in the early 1970s). [58] Boyu Wang, After the European Commission Ordered Apple to Pay Back Taxes to Ireland: Ireland’s Future in the New Global Tax Environment, 25 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 539, 547 (2018). [59]Stephen C. Loomis, The Double Irish Sandwich: Reforming Overseas Tax Havens, 43 St. Mary's L.J. 825, 838 (2011). [60] Stephen C. Loomis, The Double Irish Sandwich: Reforming Overseas Tax Havens, 43 St. Mary's L.J. 825, 838-39 (2011). [61] Stephen C. Loomis, The Double Irish Sandwich: Reforming Overseas Tax Havens, 43 St. Mary's L.J. 825, 841-42 (2011). [62] Douglas Kanter & Patrick Walsh, Taxation, Politics, and Protest in Ireland: 1662-2016, 331-355 (2019). [63] Boyu Wang, After the European Commission Ordered Apple to Pay Back Taxes to Ireland: Ireland’s Future in the New Global Tax Environment, 25 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 539, 540 (2018). [64] Boyu Wang, After the European Commission Ordered Apple to Pay Back Taxes to Ireland: Ireland’s Future in the New Global Tax Environment, 25 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 539, 540 (2018). [65] Boyu Wang, After the European Commission Ordered Apple to Pay Back Taxes to Ireland: Ireland’s Future in the New Global Tax Environment, 25 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 539, 540 (2018). [66] Lisa O’Carroll, Will Ireland’s corporation tax rise see tech companies leave Dublin?, The Guardian, (Oct. 23, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/23/will-irelands-corporation-tax-rise-see-tech-companies-leave-dublin#:~:text=Earlier%20this%20month%20Ireland%20signed%20up%20to%20landmark%20reforms%20for,system%20in%20almost%2020%20years.. [67] Lisa O’Carroll, Will Ireland’s corporation tax rise see tech companies leave Dublin?, The Guardian, (Oct. 23, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/23/will-irelands-corporation-tax-rise-see-tech-companies-leave-dublin#:~:text=Earlier%20this%20month%20Ireland%20signed%20up%20to%20landmark%20reforms%20for,system%20in%20almost%2020%20years.. [68] Andrew P. Kummer, Pro-Business But Anti-Economy?: Why Ireland’s Staunch Protection of Its Corporate Tax Regime is Preventing a Celtic Phoenix from Rising from the Ashes of the Celtic Tiger, 9 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 284, 300 (2014). [69] Andrew P. Kummer, Pro-Business But Anti-Economy?: Why Ireland’s Staunch Protection of Its Corporate Tax Regime is Preventing a Celtic Phoenix from Rising from the Ashes of the Celtic Tiger, 9 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 284, 301 (2014). [70] Andrew P. Kummer, Pro-Business But Anti-Economy?: Why Ireland’s Staunch Protection of Its Corporate Tax Regime is Preventing a Celtic Phoenix from Rising from the Ashes of the Celtic Tiger, 9 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 284, 301 (2014). [71] Andrew P. Kummer, Pro-Business But Anti-Economy?: Why Ireland’s Staunch Protection of Its Corporate Tax Regime is Preventing a Celtic Phoenix from Rising from the Ashes of the Celtic Tiger, 9 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 284, 301 (2014). [72] Andrew P. Kummer, Pro-Business But Anti-Economy?: Why Ireland’s Staunch Protection of Its Corporate Tax Regime is Preventing a Celtic Phoenix from Rising from the Ashes of the Celtic Tiger, 9 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 284, 301 (2014). [73] Andrew P. Kummer, Pro-Business But Anti-Economy?: Why Ireland’s Staunch Protection of Its Corporate Tax Regime is Preventing a Celtic Phoenix from Rising from the Ashes of the Celtic Tiger, 9 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 284, 301 (2014). [74] Andrew P. Kummer, Pro-Business But Anti-Economy?: Why Ireland’s Staunch Protection of Its Corporate Tax Regime is Preventing a Celtic Phoenix from Rising from the Ashes of the Celtic Tiger, 9 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 284, 302 (2014). [75] Andrew P. Kummer, Pro-Business But Anti-Economy?: Why Ireland’s Staunch Protection of Its Corporate Tax Regime is Preventing a Celtic Phoenix from Rising from the Ashes of the Celtic Tiger, 9 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 284, 299 (2014). [76] Lisa O’Carroll, Will Ireland’s corporation tax rise see tech companies leave Dublin?, The Guardian, (Oct. 23, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/23/will-irelands-corporation-tax-rise-see-tech-companies-leave-dublin#:~:text=Earlier%20this%20month%20Ireland%20signed%20up%20to%20landmark%20reforms%20for,system%20in%20almost%2020%20years. [77] Shu-Yi Oei, The Offshore Tax Enforcement Dragnet, 67 Emory L.J. 655, 664 (2018). [78] Shu-Yi Oei, The Offshore Tax Enforcement Dragnet, 67 Emory L.J. 655, 664 (2018) (citing I.R.C. § 61 (2012); Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 56 (1924); I.R.C. § 911. [79] Shu-Yi Oei, The Offshore Tax Enforcement Dragnet, 67 Emory L.J. 655, 664 (2018). [80] Shu-Yi Oei, The Offshore Tax Enforcement Dragnet, 67 Emory L.J. 655, 669-70 (2018). [81] Shu-Yi Oei, The Offshore Tax Enforcement Dragnet, 67 Emory L.J. 655, 669-70 (2018). [82] Jessica L. Oldani, Rehabilitating the U.S. Corporate Income Tax System in Light of Current Realities and 26 U.S.C. § 965, 46 Int'l Law. 709, 713 (2012). [83] Jessica L. Oldani, Rehabilitating the U.S. Corporate Income Tax System in Light of Current Realities and 26 U.S.C. § 965, 46 Int'l Law. 709, 712 (2012). [84] Steven A. Dean, Beyond the “Made in America Tax Plan”: GILTI and International Tax Cooperation’s Next Golden Age, 18 Pitt. Tax Rev. 341, 344 (2021) (citing I.R.C. § 164(a)(3)). [85] Steven A. Dean, Beyond the “Made in America Tax Plan”: GILTI and International Tax Cooperation’s Next Golden Age, 18 Pitt. Tax Rev. 341, 347 (2021) (citing Steven A. Dean, The Tax Expenditure Budget Is a Zombie Accountant, 46 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 265, 289 (2012)). [86] Steven A. Dean, Beyond the “Made in America Tax Plan”: GILTI and International Tax Cooperation’s Next Golden Age, 18 Pitt. Tax Rev. 341, 347 (2021) (citing Lawrence Zelenak, The Great American Tax Novel, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 969, 981 (2012), discussing an IRS enforcement measure of requiring Social Security numbers to file in 1987 that reduced the number of children on tax returns by seven million). [87] Shu-Yi Oei, The Offshore Tax Enforcement Dragnet, 67 Emory L.J. 655, 674 (2018). [88] Wei Shen & Casey Watters, Is China Creating a New Business Order? Rationalizing China’s Extraterritorial Attempt to Expand the Veil-Piercing Doctrine, 35 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 469, 473 (2015). [89] Monica Victor, On the Fragility of the International Taxation Legal System, 22 Fla. Tax Rev. 789, 796-97 (2019) (citing Appellate Body Report, Argentina-Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, WTO Doc. WT/DS453/AB/R/ (adopted May 9, 2016)). [90] Monica Victor, On the Fragility of the International Taxation Legal System, 22 Fla. Tax Rev. 789, 797 (2019). [91] Monica Victor, On the Fragility of the International Taxation Legal System, 22 Fla. Tax Rev. 789, 797 (2019) [92] Monica Victor, On the Fragility of the International Taxation Legal System, 22 Fla. Tax Rev. 789, 798-99 (2019) [93] Shu-Yi Oei, The Offshore Tax Enforcement Dragnet, 67 Emory L.J. 655, 676 (2018). [94] Shu-Yi Oei, The Offshore Tax Enforcement Dragnet, 67 Emory L.J. 655, 680 (2018). [95] Shu-Yi Oei, The Offshore Tax Enforcement Dragnet, 67 Emory L.J. 655, 680 (2018). [96] Shu-Yi Oei, The Offshore Tax Enforcement Dragnet, 67 Emory L.J. 655, 681 (2018). [97] Shu-Yi Oei, The Offshore Tax Enforcement Dragnet, 67 Emory L.J. 655, 680 (2018). [98] Steven A. Dean, Beyond the “Made in America Tax Plan”: GILTI and International Tax Cooperation’s Next Golden Age, 18 Pitt. Tax Rev. 341, 347 (2021). [99] Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Promoting Corporate Irresponsibility? Delaware as the Intellectual Property Holding State, 46 J. Corp. L. 717, 733-34 (2021) (citing Del. Code Ann. tit. 30, § 1902(b)(8) (2006)). [100] Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Promoting Corporate Irresponsibility? Delaware as the Intellectual Property Holding State, 46 J. Corp. L. 717, 733-34 (2021). [101] Steven J. Horowitz & Robert H. Sitkoff, Unconstitutional Perpetual Trusts, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1769, 1784 (2014). [102] Steven J. Horowitz & Robert H. Sitkoff, Unconstitutional Perpetual Trusts, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1769, 1784 (2014). [103] Steven J. Horowitz & Robert H. Sitkoff, Unconstitutional Perpetual Trusts, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1769, 1785 (2014). [104] Steven J. Horowitz & Robert H. Sitkoff, Unconstitutional Perpetual Trusts, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1769, 1785 (2014); Thomas H. Foye, Using South Dakota Law for Perpetual Trusts, 12-JAN Prob. & Prop. 17 (1998) (explaining that if a trust is moved from a state like Hawaii or Oregon, with taxation determined by trustee residence to South Dakota, with no trustees residing in the former state, the trust will probably no longer be subject to state income tax, except where beneficiaries live in a state that uses a trust's residency for income tax purposes on the beneficiaries' residency in that state). [105] Andrew P. Kummer, Pro-Business But Anti-Economy?: Why Ireland’s Staunch Protection of Its Corporate Tax Regime is Preventing a Celtic Phoenix from Rising from the Ashes of the Celtic Tiger, 9 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 284, 307-308 (2014). [106] Remy Farag, Witnesses clash on whether U.S. should adopt territorial system of tax at Senate panel, 2011 WL 13243501 (RIANWS). [107] Christopher H. Hanna, Tax Policy in a Nutshell 240 (2018). [108] Discussion of both corporate tax rate and a comparison of a territorial versus a worldwide system tends to raise the question of whether a VAT tax would be a fairer mechanism of taxation. The U.S. is unusual for the degree to which it relies on income tax to finance governmental operations. Sales tax functions as a quasi-VAT tax within the U.S., but does not generate as much revenue as a VAT. Defenders of income tax argue that it is less likely to be regressive because income tax arguably taxes benefit people receive. An alternative argument calls for consumption tax as a clearer example of what is derived from society. Income tax has the potential to discourage savings. VAT is insufficient to tax the full scope of consumption, because it does not as easily apply to services. [109] Michael J. Veneri Jr., Deep Dive, Chicago Style: A Roadmap for Understanding International Tax Reform, 5 Global Bus. L. Rev. 81, 105 (2016). [110] Michael J. Veneri Jr., Deep Dive, Chicago Style: A Roadmap for Understanding International Tax Reform, 5 Global Bus. L. Rev. 81, 105 (2016). [111] Michael J. Veneri Jr., Deep Dive, Chicago Style: A Roadmap for Understanding International Tax Reform, 5 Global Bus. L. Rev. 81, 114 (2016). [112] Michael J. Veneri Jr., Deep Dive, Chicago Style: A Roadmap for Understanding International Tax Reform, 5 Global Bus. L. Rev. 81, 114 (2016). [113] U.S. states and even localities have a modest differential in tax rates—ranging as high as 10 percent between states like Delaware and California. Florida and Texas appeal to high net worth individuals—and earners in all brackets—with zero personal income tax, but still charge corporate tax rates. New York is among the few states that aggressively enforces state taxes, but most others lack the enforcement budgets to carry out enforcement to the extent of the federal government. Formally, there is only one way to avoid paying U.S. income tax: locating in Puerto Rico or one of the other territories. However, this type of federal tax reduction is rarely undertaken except by individuals, likely because of more limited workforces. [114] Michael J. Veneri Jr., Deep Dive, Chicago Style: A Roadmap for Understanding International Tax Reform, 5 Global Bus. L. Rev. 81, 105-106 (2016). [115] Michael J. Veneri Jr., Deep Dive, Chicago Style: A Roadmap for Understanding International Tax Reform, 5 Global Bus. L. Rev. 81, 107 (2016). [116] Michael J. Veneri Jr., Deep Dive, Chicago Style: A Roadmap for Understanding International Tax Reform, 5 Global Bus. L. Rev. 81, 109 (2016). [117] Michael J. Veneri Jr., Deep Dive, Chicago Style: A Roadmap for Understanding International Tax Reform, 5 Global Bus. L. Rev. 81, 109 (2016). [118] Michael J. Veneri Jr., Deep Dive, Chicago Style: A Roadmap for Understanding International Tax Reform, 5 Global Bus. L. Rev. 81, 109 (2016). [119] Michael J. Veneri Jr., Deep Dive, Chicago Style: A Roadmap for Understanding International Tax Reform, 5 Global Bus. L. Rev. 81, 113 (2016). [120] Michael J. Veneri Jr., Deep Dive, Chicago Style: A Roadmap for Understanding International Tax Reform, 5 Global Bus. L. Rev. 81, 113 (2016). [121] Michael J. Veneri Jr., Deep Dive, Chicago Style: A Roadmap for Understanding International Tax Reform, 5 Global Bus. L. Rev. 81, 114 (2016). [122] Michael J. Veneri Jr., Deep Dive, Chicago Style: A Roadmap for Understanding International Tax Reform, 5 Global Bus. L. Rev. 81, 114 (2016). [123] Michael J. Veneri Jr., Deep Dive, Chicago Style: A Roadmap for Understanding International Tax Reform, 5 Global Bus. L. Rev. 81, 114 (2016).
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